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Abstract
This paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for two-
sided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares.
We show that independent of whether consumers are uniformly or
non-uniformly distributed, advertisement levels neither depend on the
media price nor on the location of the media rm. An increase in ad-
vertising revenues does not change location but only the media price.
However, we show that if the distribution is asymmetric, market shares
will be asymmetric as well, and that the media rm with the larger
market share has the higher media price. Thus, even in absence of any
xed costs, this rm makes a higher prot per reader and in aggregate
than its smaller rival
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a huge increase in the literature on two-sided markets
(e.g., Armstrong, 2006, and Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). The media in-
dustry is one of the most important examples of two-sided markets, and many
papers have used Hotelling-inspired models to analyze media rmslocation,
price setting on consumer markets and sales of advertising space.1 However,
most of the papers make very specic assumptions about competition for
advertising and about consumer heterogeneity. In particular, it is typically
assumed that consumers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line.
This tends to oversimplify location decisions, characteristically resulting in
maximum or minimum di¤erentiation, depending on the set-up of the model.
This paper tries to make progress on our understanding of media rms
location decisions and strategic behavior on the consumer and advertising
market by relaxing the assumption that consumers are uniformly distributed.
Furthermore, we do not make any specic assumption about the type of
competition in the advertisement market. Media rms can compete by prices
or by ad space, and we allow for both single-homing and multi-homing.
Within this set-up we show that a non-uniform distribution of consumers
implies that the media rms will end up with asymmetric market shares but
with the same level of advertising revenue per consumer. We further show
that the rm with the smaller market share nds it unprotable to exercise
its market power in the smaller segment by charging higher prices. On the
contrary, its equilibrium price will be lower than that of its larger rival. The
smaller rm will therefore unambiguously be less protable than the larger
one, measured both in terms of revenue per consumer and in aggregate.
2 The model
We employ a Hotelling model with two competing media rms, i = 1; 2.
Media rm i charges price pi and is located at xi: Without loss of gener-
1See, for instance, Anderson and Coate (2005), Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien
(2005), Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002) and Peitz and Valletti (2004).
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ality, we assume that x2  x1: The media rms also sell advertising space
to producers, and the resulting advertising level is given by ai: The media
consumers may have negative or positive attitudes towards ads, and the net
utility level of a consumer located at x who buys media product i is given
by U = v   pi   t(x   xi)2   d(ai). With this specication the consumers
perceive ads as a bad if d(ai) < 0 and as a good if d(ai) > 0:2 The constant
v > 0 is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to ensure market coverage.
Denoting the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying media product
1 and 2 by ~x; we nd
ex = 1
2

x1 + x2 +
p2   p1 + d(a2)  d(a1)
t(x2   x1)

: (1)
Consumers located to the left of ~x buy media product 1, while consumers to
the right of ~x buy media product 2.
The consumers are continuously distributed on  1  a < b  1; and
the cumulative distribution is denoted by F (x):We normalize the population
size to one, and the density function f(x) = F 0(x) is assumed to be log-
concave on [a; b] and twice di¤erentiable. The marginal costs of producing the
media product equal c, and for simplicity we set marginal costs of inserting
ads to zero, so that the prot functions of the two media rms read as
1 = F (ex)(p1   c+ A1()); (2)
2 = (1  F (ex))(p2   c+ A2());
where Ai is advertising revenue per consumer. As usual in the literature, ag-
gregate advertising revenues depend linearly on the number of consumers.
Otherwise, the model is very general. We allow both single-homing and
multi-homing for the advertisers, and assume that ad revenues per con-
sumer depend on the strategic variables s1 and s2; such that Ai = Ai(s1; s2).
Advertisement levels are a function of these strategic variables, such that
ai = ai(s1; s2). In a simple Cournot setting we have si = ai. But the model
2See Depken II and Wilson (2004) and Sonnac (2000) for a discussion of whether
magazine/newspaper readers consider advertising as a good or a bad.
3
also allows for price competition on the ad-market, i.e. it can accommodate
competition in strategic substitutes as well as strategic complements.
In the following we consider a two-stage game, where the media rms
choose locations before they simultaneously compete for consumers and ad-
vertising revenue (setting pi and si; respectively). We assume that the prot
functions (2) are quasi-concave in pi and si; and that solutions are interior.
Thereby, we can use the rst-order conditions to determine optimal prices
and advertising strategies.
As for prices we nd that
@1
@p1
= F (~x) + (p1   c+ A1)f(~x) @ex
@p1
= 0; (3)
@2
@p2
= [1  F (ex)] + (p2   c+ A2)f(~x)  @ex
@p2

= 0;
and it is straight forward to verify that consumer prices are strategic com-
plements (as is typically the case in Hotelling models).
From equation (1), we derive
@ex
@p1
=   1
2t(x2   x1) and
@ex
@p2
=
1
2t(x2   x1) : (4)
The rst-order conditions for advertisement strategies are given by
@1
@s1
= F (ex)@A1
@s1
+ (p1   c+ A1)f(ex)  @ex
@a1
@a1
@s1
+
@ex
@a2
@a2
@s1

= 0; (5)
@2
@s2
= [1  F (ex)] @A2
@s2
  (p2   c+ A2)f(ex)  @ex
@a2
@a2
@s2
+
@ex
@a1
@a1
@s2

= 0:
There are strategic interactions between the media rms in the advertising
market if the last term in the square brackets of equation (5) is di¤erent from
zero ( @ex
@aj
@aj
@si
6= 0; i 6= j).3 However, we do not have to specify whether the
rms compete in strategic complements or strategic substitutes on this side
of the market:
3We have @aj=@si = 0 if the media rms are monopolists in their respective ad markets.
4
We can now show:
Lemma 1 Advertisement levels depend only on the marginal disutility of
adverts and not on the media price, the location of the media rms or the
size of the market.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 1 is closely related to the Anderson and Coate (2005) result.
They show that only the ad revenue functions and the (dis-)utility of ads
determine equilibrium ad levels per consumer in Hotelling models with uni-
form distributions. Lemma 1 generalizes this result to arbitrary consumer
distributions.
Let the common equilibrium advertisement revenue per media consumer
be denoted by bA. Using (3) and (4), we have
p1 = 2t(x2   x1)F (ex)
f(ex) + c  bA; (6)
p2 = 2t(x2   x1)1  F (ex)
f(ex) + c cA:
The di¤erence in the media prices is thus given by
p2   p1 = 2t(x2   x1)1  2F (ex)
f(ex) : (7)
The important message from equation (7) is that the media rm with the
larger market share charges the higher price; p2 > p1 if F (~x) < 1=2 and vice
versa. This is true even though there are no network e¤ects or other factors
which make one rm dominate its rival. The intuition for this result can be
seen from equation (3); the rst term shows that the gain for each media
rm of setting a higher price is proportional to its market share. However,
since A1 = A2 = bA both rms face inter alia the same reduction in ad
sales if they increase the price. Thus, the rm with the larger market share
unambiguously benets most from setting a high price. Not surprisingly, the
dominant rms ability to set a higher price than its rival is increasing in
the di¤erentiation between the media rms; (x2 x1); and in the consumers
transportation costs, t.
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As in Anderson et al (1997) we can now write prots as a function of
locations only:4
b1 = 2t(x2   x1)F (ex)2
f(ex) ; (8)b2 = 2t(x2   x1)(1  F (ex))2
f(ex) :
Let y denote the median consumer such that F (y) = 0:5. We are now able
to demonstrate
Proposition 1 If prot functions (8) are quasi-concave, rm 1 has a higher
market share than rm 2 if f 0(y) < 0; and a smaller market share if f 0(y) > 0.
Proof: We can write the location as an implicit function (see (1)):
g() = x1 + x2
2
+
1  2F (ex)
f(ex) = 0
because a1 = a2 and thus d(a2)  d(a1) = 0. Partial di¤erentiation yields
gex =  3f 2 + f 0(1  2F )
f 2
; gx1 = gx2 =
1
2
) @ex
@x1
=
@ex
@x2
=
f 2
6f 2 + 2f 0(1  2F ) :
Marginal prots with respect to locations can consequently be written as:
@b1
@x1
=  2tF
2
f
+
@x
@x1
2t(x2   x1)F (2f 2   f 0F )
f 2
; (9)
@b2
@x2
=
2t(1  F )2
f
  @x
@x2
2t(x2   x1)(1  F )(2f 2 + f 0(1  F ))
f 2
:
Logconcavity of f(x) implies @ex=@x1 = @ex=@x2 > 0 (see Anderson et al
(1997), p. 107) and 2f 2   f 0F > 0; 2f 2   f 0(1  F ) > 0: An interior solution
to (9) thus satises x1 > a and x

2 < b. Let us evaluate the marginal prots if
both rms choose locations such that the median consumer is the indi¤erent
consumer, i.e. if ex = y. Dene
D  2t(x2   x1) @~x
@xi
> 0;    t
2f(y)
+D:
4For uniqueness and existence in the location game, see Assumptions 1 and 2 in An-
derson et al (1997).
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Since @ex=@x1 = @ex=@x2, marginal prots for ex = y are equal to
@b1
@x1
(ex = y) =   f 0(y)D
2f 2
; (10)
@b2
@x2
(ex = y) =    f 0(y)D
2f 2
:
Suppose that rm 1 has chosen x1 such that its prots are maximized and
rm 2 has set x2 such that ex = y holds. From (10), it follows
@b1
@x1
(ex = y) = 0) @b2
@x2
(ex = y) =  f 0(y)D
f 2
:
Hence, rm 2s marginal prots are positive if f 0(y) < 0, and negative if
f 0(y) > 0. Consequently, rm 2 will increase x2 if f 0(y) < 0, thereby increas-
ing rm 1s market share, and vice versa. 
Proposition 1 shows that asymmetric distributions lead to asymmetric
market sizes. Without loss of generality we have assumed that rm 2 is
located (weakly) to the right of rm 1. It thus follows that rm 1 will have
a larger market share than rm 2 if and only if f 0(y) is negative. The reason
is that the location decision a¤ects the behavior of the marginal consumer
only. If f 0(y) is negative, the distribution is skewed at the median consumer
such that rm 2 gains by moving to the right of F (y) = 0:5; as illustrated in
Figure 1.
y
F(y) = 0.5
f(y)
Firm 2
Figure 1: Firm 2 locates to the right of F (y) = 0:5 if f 0(y) < 0:
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Note carefully that the market share result holds both for the media
market and for the ad market. Since ad revenue per consumer is the same
across rms, the media rm with the larger market share ends up with higher
mark-ups in the media market and higher total ad revenue. In this sense the
two-sidedness of the market tends to favor rms with large market shares,
even though there are no economies of scale nor any network e¤ects.
3 Concluding remarks
Our paper has demonstrated that a generalized Hotelling model of two-sided
markets behaves like a standard Hotelling model in which ad revenues just
reduce marginal production costs. More importantly, we have demonstrated
that market shares di¤er if the distribution of consumers is asymmetric, with
the dominant rm charging the higher price. In particular, our model may
explain why market shares and prots di¤er in two-sided media markets even
if production costs do not.
4 Appendix
By inserting for (pi   c+ Ai)f(~x) from (3) into (5) we have
@1
@s1
= F (ex)"@A1
@s1
 

@ex
@p1
 1
@ex
@a1
@a1
@s1
+
@ex
@a2
@a2
@s1
#
; (11)
@2
@s2
= [1  F (ex)]"@A2
@s2
+

@ex
@p2
 1
@ex
@a2
@a2
@s2
+
@ex
@a1
@a1
@s2
#
:
Equations (1) and (4) further yield (for i 6= j)
@ex
@ai
@ai
@si
+
@ex
@aj
@aj
@si
=
@ex
@pi

d0(ai)
@ai
@si
  d0(aj)@aj
@si

: (12)
In equilibrium, @1=@s1 = @2=@s2 = 0: Equations (11) and (12) thus imply
@A1
@s1
  d0(a1)@a1
@s1
+ d0(a2)
@a2
@s1
= 0; (13)
@A2
@s2
  d0(a2)@a2
@s2
+ d0(a1)
@a1
@s2
= 0:
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Expression (13) implicitly determines the advertising level as a function of
the marginal disutility of ads and the ad revenue function. Even though the
media rm with the larger market share has the higher total revenue from
ads, the ad revenue per consumer is thus independent of the market size and
the media price.
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